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1 Introduction
In many economic situations it seems perfectly reasonable that agents have
some say not only over their choice of action, but also over the timing of that
choice. It is, therefore, important to check the robustness of results obtained
from models in which agents are restricted to a certain timing structure.
In this paper is shown that letting the timing decision be endogenous in
a two-player game of incomplete information has serious impact on what
can be equilibrium behaviour. In particular, the strategies used in a game
restricted to simultaneous moves will never be used in equilibrium in a version
of the same game where sequential moves are possible. In other words, once
sequential moves are allowed the players will never mimic the equilibrium
behaviour of players in the simultaneous move game. In contrast, complete
separation in time is shown always to be an equilibrium.
The model has a number of special features. There are two players and
two periods. A player can take action in one of the two periods only. If she
acts in period 1 she cannot act in period 2, and vice versa. There is no cost
of waiting, that is, there is no discounting between the two periods. Payoffs
are realized after period 2. However, the two periods need not be separated
by any significant physical time. What is necessary is that a player acting
in the first period makes some irreversible decision which the other player
can observe before choosing her action in the second period. Another distin-
guishing feature of the model is that the players have incomplete information
about the type of the other player. Player i's type influences only her own
payoff, and not that of player j. However, the action of player i does influ-2
ence the payoff of player j. The incomplete information gives an incentive
for players to wait until the second period in order to observe the action of
the other player. On the other hand, being in the first period can be advan-
tageous in that it may entail a first mover advantage. Furthermore, some
types of a player may prefer to hide their identity by delaying their action
until the second period, while others will want to separate themselves from
these "bad„ types. The analysis of these conflicting motives of hiding and
separating, and of reaping a first mover advantage versus reacting optimally
to the rival's action, is the focus of the paper.
The main result is that simultaneous move configurations, where both
players always move in the same period, regardless of type, can never be
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBEs) of this timing game. In contrast, sequen-
tial move configurations, where one player always moves in the first period,
regardless of type, while the other always moves in the second period, re-
gardless of type, can always be supported as PBEs. Furthermore, there may
be equilibria where some types of both players are in period 1 and others in
period 2. An example of such an equilibrium is presented in Section 4.
One natural application is to the well known Stackelberg leadership model.
Consider for example two firms who know their own unit cost, but not that
of their rival. The results from the general model show that leadership is a
PBE of a model where the firms not only choose how much to produce, but
also when to produce it. However, the (Bayesian) Cournot-Nash solution,
in which the two firms simultaneously choose outputs, cannot be supported
as an equilibrium of the more general timimg game. Recently, a number of
studies have analysed endogenous timing in various versions of the Stackel-3
berg model. For instance, Mailath (1988) lets a duopolist receive a private
signal about a random demand parameter, that is, a parameter of common
value to the two firms. This firm can then decide whether to play Nash or
to be a Stackelberg leader. Mailath finds that the only equilbrium (after
invoking an equilibrium refinement) has the informed firm moving first, no
matter what the observed signal is. In Albaek (1990) I ask whether private
cost information can lead to an endogenous explanation of the distribution of
Stackelberg roles. However, in that paper the firms decide before they know
their own cost whether they will play Stackelberg or Nash, and who shall be
leader and follower. The answer is that in some cases the firms can indeed
agree on such an endogenous distribution of roles.
Another strand of literature has analysed endogenous timing in Stackel-
berg models in full information environments. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)
extend the work of Dowrick (1986) to show that in a complete information
model close to the model of this paper the two Stackelberg equilibria (that is,
either firm can be the leader) are the only two pure strategy equilibria if at-
tention is restricted to undominated strategies (Theorem VIII). Hence, their
result confirms that the sequential move equilibrium tends to perform better
than (simultaneous) Nash if games are extended to model the timing decision
endogenously. A similar conclusion is reached by Robson (1990), who anal-
yses a price-setting duopoly in which the firms can choose and commit to a
price at any of a countable set of dates before the fixed market-clearing date.
However, the cost of setting a price is increasing in the difference between
the price-setting and the market-clearing dates. Robson's analysis shows
that "the only subgame perfect equilibria are more reminiscent of Stackel-4
berg than of Bertrand„. Simon (1987) is the only paper modelling the timing
decision in continuous time. The general conclusion carries over to this set-
ting, since he finds that in a Stackelberg~Cournot model in continuous time
the two firms will never choose output simultaneously.l
Saloner (1987) analyses a complete information Cournot model in which
the firms can produce in both periods while the market clears after the second
period. He shows that there is a large set of subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria, basically consisting of the points on the outer envelope of the reaction
functions between the two~ Stackelberg points. Banerjee and Cooper (1991)
show that introducing a small fixed cost for producing in both periods in
Saloner's model eliminates all equilibria except the Cournot equilibrium in
the first period and the two Stackelberg equilibria. However, a simple form of
asymmetric information about costs also eliminates the Cournot equilibrium.
In the next section the model is presented, while Section 3 contains the
main results. In Section 4 I concentrate on the Stackelberg version of the
model and give an example of an equilibrium where the firms sometimes
are in period 1 and sometimes in period 2. In the final section I offer some
concluding remarks.
lIn fact, Simon only uses the Stackelberg~Cournot model as an example of a more
general theory of timing decisions in continuous time.
ZAssuming for simplicity that each firm has only one Stackelberg point.5
2 The Model
The players face two decisions: what action to take, and when to take it. If a
player acts in period one, she cannot act in period 2, and vice versa. A player
acting in period two can, before making her decision, observe the choice of a
player acting in period one. However, if both players act in the same period,
neither of them observes the other's action before choosing her own. Payoffs
are determined after period two, and there is no discounting between the
two periods. The presentation which follows at times relies heavily on the
construction in Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990). The two
players are denoted A and B. Each player has private information summarized
by her type t;, an element of T; -{ t;,..., t;' }, ~ T; ~ 1 2, i- A, B. To keep
the analysis simple, T; is assumed to be finite with elements ordered so that
t~ G t? G... G t;'. Before period 1 each player learns her own type t;. She
dces not know the other player's type; however, she does know the prior
distribution p~ over T~ from which the other player's type was drawn. The
distributions pa and pb are assumed independent and common knowledge.
If nobody acts in period 1 the players have to form beliefs about which
type of the other player they are facing in period 2. Let Q; be the set of all
probability distributions on T;. Then a period 2 belief about player i's type
is an element q; E Q;. Hence q;(t;) is the probability which player j in the
second period places on player i being of type t;.
The set of possible actions of player i is denoted S;. Player i therefore has
to choose an element s; E S;. For both players I assume that S; is a closed
interval (O,s;~ of the real line. Player i's payofffunction is ~; : S; x S~ x T; --~ R.6
Note that only player j's action, but not her type, influences the payoff of
player i.3 Furthermore, the timing of actions is not per se important; in
particular, there is no discounting between the two periods.
A strategy of player i is a quadruple of functions, o; - (9;,v; , o?",o?f )
where 6; : T; ~[0,1~ gives the probability that player i of a certain type t;
will act in the first period while o; : T; -~ S; is the action as a function of
type that she will take if she acts in the first period. If she instead decides
to act in period 2, there are two possibilities: o?" : T; -~ S; is, again as a
function of type, the action that she will take in period 2 if player j also acts
in period 2(n is for "Nashn ); finally, o?~ : S~ x T; -~ S; gives, as a function
of player j's (period 1) action and player i's type, the action that i will take
in the second period when j has acted in the first period (f for "follower„ ).
Given a strategy profile (aa,ob) the expected payoff to player A of type
ta is then
Pa(aae QDita) - ~ Ba(ta)Pb(tb)e6(t6)~a(aa(ta),06(tb)ita)
Tb
~ ~ Ba(tn)p6(t6)[1 - B6(t6)~~a(~a(ta)r Q6'(Qa1ta)~ tb)~ ta)
T6
~ ~[1 - Ba(ta)IP6(tb)86(t6)~a(Qa~(Q6(t6)ita),Q6(t6)rta)
Ts
~ ~[1 - ea(ta)~P6(t6)[1 - B6(t6)J~a(~an(ta)i Q6n(t6)i ta)
Ty
The second period "Nash" strategies Qá" and ob" will depend on the
second period beliefs q, and qb. It is convenient to consider in general si-
multaneous choice equilibria (Q;,ab) depending on beliefs qa and qb. Hence,
3Letting player i's payoff depend directly on player j's type would change the set-up
into a signalling game.7




I shall assume that, given any beliefs q, and qb, the simultaneous choice
equilibrium is unique, so that the simultaneous choice equilibrium strategy
o;(q;, q„t;), is uniquely defined.4
A period 2 belief q; E Q; is said to be consistent if
[1- e;(t;)]P;(t;) if I- e;(t;)1 ~ o
9;(t;) - ~T [1 - B;(t;))Pt(t;) ~[
Acting in period 2 is a zero probability event if B;(t;) - 1 for all t; E T;. In
that case Bayesian updating puts no restrictions on beliefs, and any q; E Q;
is consistent.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a quadruple (o„ ob, q„ qb) for which
(i) P;(~;,Q„ t;) ~ P;(a;,o„t;) for all t; and Q;
(ii) o?~(s„t;) E argmax,,ES, ~r;(s;, s„ t;)
(iii) q; and q~ are consistent, and
~2n(t~) - ~"(9;,qi~t~)
The first condition states that the strategy profile has to be a Nash equilib-
rium. Condition (ii) ensures that a follower will always act optimally in the
second period; hence, incredible threats are eliminated. The third condition
says that the strategies in a second period Nash-like situation can be rational-
ized by some beliefs q; and q~ over which types of the other player would wait
4See Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) for a discusaion of this assumption.8
and act in the second period. Of course, given a particular strategy profile,
one or both of the conditions (ii) and (iii) may be implied by (i). However,
for some strategy profiles certain events may happen with zero probability.
In those situations conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that responses to out-
of-equilibrium behaviour are rational. Note that no belief system about a
leader's type is specified in condition (ii). A follower cares only about the
action choice of the leader. The opponent's type matters only to a player in
so far as it indicates something about the action that the opponent will take.
When the leader has already chosen her action the follower simply maximizes
payoffs taking the leader's action as given. In this situation the leader's type
is of no interest to the follower.
The reader may well find the following assumptions about the payofffunc-
tions quite restrictive. However, the results are later shown to hold under
a wide set of alternative assumptions. For the moment, the following must
hold for all (s;,s~) E(S;,S~) and for all t; E T;, i- A, B,
Assumption l. ~r; is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable
in s;, and decreasing and continuously differentiable in s~.
Assumption 2. án;(s;, s~, t;) is decreasing and continuously differentiable
in s~.
Assumption 3. á~r;(s;, s„ t;) is increasing in t;.
Assumption 4. For all q; E Q;, q~ E Q~ and t; E T;, a"(q;, q„t~) E(0, s;)9
The first assumption is fairly self-explanatory, while the second asserts
that the actions of the two players are strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanako-
plos and Klemperer, 1985). If player j increases s„ player i will respond by
lowering s; in order to meet the first order condition for maximizing her pay-
off. In other words, the best response functions are downward sloping. As-
sumption 3 is by Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) called "positive-monotonicity
of best response functions". The higher a player's type, the more aggressive
her behaviour will be, since the best response function shifts out. Hence, the
lowest type is also the "weakestT type from the opponent's point of view.
The final assumption restricts simultaneous choice equilibria to be interior.
3 Results
In this section the main results from the analysis are presented. As stated
in the introduction the aim is to describe what can be Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria of the timing game set up in the previous section. However, in the
first two propositions I shall state what can ~t be equilibria.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1- 4 there is no Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium in which BQ(ta) - 1 for all ta E Ta and B6(fb) - 1 for all tb E Tb.
Proof See Appendix. ~~
The intuition behind this result is as follows. It is easy to see that, under
Assumptions 1, 3, and 4, each type of a player must be choosing differentio
actions. Then the other player, say B, will in general not be choosing her
exact best response to A's action, but rather an average best response. By
deviating to period 2 B will observe A's period 1 action, and, therefore, be
able to respond optimally. Hence, both players alwaysa acting in period 1
cannot be an equilibrium.
Remark. Often a stronger statement than Proposition 1 can be made,
namely that there is no PBE in which B;(t;) - 1 for all t; E T; and B~(t~) ~ 0
for some t~ E T~, i~ j. Imagine that one player (say A) always acts in period
1. When would a type of player B be willing also to act in period 1 with
positive probability? The answer is: only if all types of A choose the same
action. If two types of A choose different actions, B will only be choosing an
average best response but would by moving in period 2 observe A's action
and be able to play the best response to each of A's actions. That all types
of A would choose the same actions cannot in general be ruled out; however,
it seems rather unlikely. In the Appendix I discuss this possibility further
and give a sufficient condition that it cannot happen.
The proposition says that equilibria in which both types always act in
period 1 are not possible. The next proposition rules out such situations in
period 2 as well.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1- 4 there is no Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium in which B;(t;) - 0 for al! t; E T; and B~(t~) c 1 for some tJ E T„
i ~ j.
sIn this context "always" means "with probability one for all t; E T;".11
Proo~ See Appendix. ~~
Again the intuition is quite straightforward. Imagine now that player
B always moves in period 2. It is easy to show that under Assumptions 1- 4
the game exhibits a"first mover advantagen in the following sense. Iinagine
that only one type of player A waits until the second period. Then that
type would prefer moving in the first period to the period 2 equilibrium. It
would then choose a]arger action which has no first order effects on its pay-
off (due to the envelope theorem) while it would lead the follower to be less
aggressive. Hence, there can be no PBE in which only one type of player A
moves in the second period. Now, if a subset (with more than one type) of
T, moves in period 2 with a positive probability, B will, using Bayes' rule,
form a belief about who she is playing against. Denote by t;~ the highest
type of A playing in period 2. It can then be shown that tM would prefer a
period 2 equilibrium in which player B knew for sure that A was of the type
tM to the equilibrium when B only knows that t;~ is the highest of several
types. However, because of the first mover advantage, it is then clear that tM
will always deviate from the supposed equilibrium to the first period. This
argument breaks any possible equilibrium with Ba(tQ) C 1 for some tQ E T,.
Two possible types of equilibrium remain. One can be thought of as a
leader-follower situation where one player always moves in period 1 while the
other always moves in period 2. The other possibility entails both players
using strategies where they move in period 1 for some types and in period two
for other types. The next proposition states that leader-follower situations
can always be supported as PBEs.12
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-~ there always exist Perfect Bayesian
Equiliória in which B;(t;) - 1 for al! t; E T; and 9~(t~) - 0 for all t~ E T„
i ~ j.
Proof. See Appendix. ~~
Clearly the player who in equilibrium is supposed always to move in pe-
riod 2(say, player B) will never deviate, since the other player's (A's) action
choice is not changed by this deviation; hence, deviating to period 1 for B
simply means an unprofitable loss of information. I then concentrate on the
belief used by B if she unexpectedly finds herself called upon to play a period
2 game instead of being a"followerr. If I can find a belief which keeps all
A types from deviating, I have proved the proposition. Now, for an A type
considering a deviation the worst B can think is that A for sure is the lowest
(which is also the "weakest" ) type tá, since B then will behave aggressively
and choose a high sb. Because of the first mover advantage, type tá will not
deviate if B holds this belief. Neither will any other type, since she will not
only loose the first mover advantage, but also mistakenly be taken for a lower
type in the period 2 game. Hence, I have found a belief which supports the
sequenti~.l choice equilibrium path described in the appendix. Since I am free
to choose B's period 2 belief, the proposition is indeed proved. Note that
the proposition says nothing about which player will be in period 1; both
"leader-follower" configurations can be sustained as equilibria. Furthermore,
the proposition only describes the equilibrium path, not the equilibrium it-
self, since the associated beliefs are not specified. In fact, each of the two13
outcomes can be supported by any belief belonging to a connected setó in
the space of possible beliefs, Q, or Qb, whichever is relevant.
Assumptions 1- 4 are admittedly quite restrictive and rule out several
well known industrial organization models. If, for instance, types are unit
costs of production, and a higher type is a firm with a higher unit cost,
neither standard Cournot nor Bertrand (with differentiated products) mod-
els meet all four assumptions. The Cournot model fails Assumption 3; the
Bertrand model meets Assumption 3, but not Assumptions 1 and 2. I there-
fore consider a set of alternative assumptions and show that the propositions
still hold.
Assumption 1'. ~r; is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in
s;, and increasing and continously differentiable in s~.
Assumption 2'. án;(s;, s„ t;) is increasing and continuously differentiable
in s~.
Assumption 9'. ae ~r;(s;, s„ t;) is decreasing in t;.
,
According to Assumption 1' player i now sees player j as less aggres-
sive if player j chooses a higher action, while Assumption 2' says that the
actions of the two players are strategic complements. Finally, Assumption 3'
is what Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) call "negative-monotonicity of best re-
óSee Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).14
sponse functions„. Note that, with incomplete information about the rival's
unit cost, the standard Cournot duopoly model meets Assumptions 1, 2, 3'
and 4, while the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products meets
Assumptions 1', 2', 3 and 4. The following proposition can now be proved.
Proposition 4 For any quadruple consisting of Assumptions 1 or 1', 2 or
2', 8 or 8 ; and .(, Propositions 1- 9 will hold.
To economize on space the proof of this proposition is omitted. However,
the basic intuition is that changing one of the assumptions simply changes
which type would for sure deviate in the proof of Proposition 2, and therefore
also the specification of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in Proposition 3. If I
change only one of the assumptions, the lowest type A specífied to stay in
period 2 in the proof of Proposition 2 will always deviate to period 1; therefore
the q, in the proof of Proposition 3 should put all weight on the highest type.
If I change yet another assumption, the incentives flip once more, and we are
back to the highest type deviating.
As mentioned above, there may be more than the two sets of equilibria
already found. Excluding the unlikely possibility discussed in the remark to
Proposition 1, all additional equilibria would be characterized by some types
of each player moving in the first period and others in the second, perhaps
even with some types using mixed strategies to determine when to produce.
In the next section I present an example of such an equilibrium.15
4 A Simple Example
In this section I shall present a simple example based on an application to
Stackelberg's leader-follower model. The derivations are quite elementary
and therefore not be shown here; however, they can be found in Appendix 2
of Albaek (1991).
Consider a duopoly where the inverse demand function is linear in total
output
P-d-(x,-~xa)
where x, and xb are the outputs of the two firms A and B. The products
of the two firms are assumed to be homogenous, and the slope has been
normalized to unity. A firm's type is now its unit cost c;, which can take on
two values only. With probability 0.5, c; - 1, and with probability 0.5, c; -
h,i-A,B.
The analysis in the preceding section showed that there exist at least
two equilibrium outcomes of this game. In one Ba(I) - Ba(h) - 1 while
Bb(!) - Bb(h) - 0; in the other Bo(!) - B,(h) - 0 and 96(1) - By(h) - 1. The
question is whether there are more equilibria.
Suppose both firms with probability 1 produce in period 1 if they have
low marginal costs, and with probability 1 in period 2 if their marginal costs
are high. Framed in the language of this paper, B;(1) - 1 and B;(h) - 0, i
- A, B. I shall now show that this can be equilibrium behaviour for some
parameter values, but not for others.
The expected profit to a low cost firm from this situation is16
P(I) - 256~3d
~ h - 4I]~
while the expected profit to a high cost firm is
P(h) - 512~5d
- 9h ~ 4IJ~ ~ 18[d - h]~
By deviating to period 2, and making the optimal output choices, the low
cost firm would alternatively have expected profits of
P~(I) - 72~2d ~ h- 3I]~ -~
512~5d
- h- 4I]s
Similarly, the maximal expected profits to a high cost firm from deviating
to period 1 is
P,(h) - 768
~9d - 13h f 4IJ2
Suppose the parameters have the specific values d- 120, 1- 10, and h-
20. Then P(1) - 1355, P(h) - 969, P'(1) - 1304, and P'(h) - 963. Since P(1)
1 P'(1) and P(h) ~ P'(h), the strategies form an equilibrium.T It is obvious
that the low cost leader will not want to deviate. Since the cost difference is
big, there is a large benefit to the high cost follower of knowing exactly which
type it is playing against, and it will forego the first mover advantage to get
this information. Hence, this example shows that there can be equilibria of
other types than the ones discussed in the previous section. Furthermore,
~That is, the timing functiona B;(c;) given above, and the asaociated quantity functiona
x;(c;), x~"(c;) and a;f(c;), which are not shown here, form an equilibrium.17
the equilibrium is one in pure strategies, since for both firms 9;(c;) is either
0 or 1 for both types.
Now, change the value of h to 12. Then P(1) - 1292, P(h) - 1201, P'(1)
- 1271, P'(h) - 1210. In this case the high cost firm will deviate to period 1,
and the situation is not an equilibrium. Since the high and low cost fir:ns are
so similar, the value to the high cost firm of knowing which type it is playing
against is small, while it will gain substantially if it ends up being a leader
to a high cost follower. It is easy to show that with these cost values (1 -
10 and h- 12) there are no other pure strategy equilibrium outcomes than
the two Stackelberg situations. Hence, any other equilibrium would have to
involve at least one type of one of the firms mixing over its timing decision.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed a game of imperfect information in which the players
not only decide what to do, but also when to do it. Comparing the equilibria
of this model to those of a game where the players are restricted to act
simultaneously, one finds that the equilibrium strategies are never the same.
This result underlines the problems of concentrating on simultaneous-
choice models in a world where economic agents often can choose when to
act from a large set of possible times. Modelling this explicitly may prove
very difficult. However, this paper has shown that using a simple two-period
model can give drastically different results than the one-period simultaneous-
choice model.18
Appendix
In this appendix I make extensive use of the method used in the proof of
Theorem 2 in Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990).
Before proving Proposition 1 it is convenient to introduce some extra
notation. Consider a simultaneous choice situation with beliefs q; and q~.




Lemma 1 UnderAssumptions 1 and 3, i's simultaneous choice best response
~"(a~, q„t;) is increasing in t; if its value lies in the interior of S; -[0,s;~.
Proof. If ~; (o~, q„ t;) is interior, it is the s; which secures that
~ 9i(ti) a~t(s;, o~(ti), t~) - 0 T 8s;
,
By Assumptions 1 and 3 the lemma is obvious. ~~
Proofof Proposition 1.
It is clear that if an equilibrium with da(ta) - 1 for all ta E Ta and
66(tb) - 1 for all tb E T6 exists, we must have oQ(ta) - vá(pa, pb, ta) and
~y (tb) - ab (Pb, Pa, tb). From Lemma 1 and Assumption 4 we know that
different types of a player always will choose different actions. Consider
the timing choice of a type tb. Acting in period 1 she chooses Qb(pb,pa,tb) -
~6 (aa, Pa, tb) - argmax~yESb ~T. Pa(ta)~6(96, ~a(ta), tb). However, if tb chooses19
to wait until the second period, she can react optimally to A's action, that
is, choose ~b~(sa, tb) - argmax,óES6 ab(sb, sa, tb). Since A chooses a differ-
ent action for each ta, and sa has a(negative) impact on ~rb, in general
~b~(v;(ta), tb) ~~b (o;, pa, tb). Since the former is chosen optimally for each
value of o;(t,), it must be true that ~T, pa(ta)1rp(~b~(Oá(ta), tb), Qá(ta), tb) i
~T, pa(ta)ab(~d (o;, pa, tb), o;(ta), tb). Hence, tb will always deviate to period
2. ~~
Remark to Proposition 1. In the remark I mention that a stronger result
than Proposition 1 often can be shown to hold, namely that there is no PBE
in which 9;(t;) - 1 for all t; E T; and t7~(t~) ~ 0 for some t~ E T„ i~ j.
To see when this is true suppose Ba(t,) - 1 for all ta E T,. Fix a player B
strategy ob - (Bb, ob, ab", ob~). A player A period 1 best response must then
be
~á(ob,ta) E argmax~Pó(tb){B6(tD) ~a(sai~b(tb) rta)
saESo Tb
~~1 - eóltó)~~a(9ai ~6f(saitb)ita))
If ~a(ob,t,) is interior it is an sa which secures that
~Tp P6(t6)leó(tb)8~a ~a(sai ~6 (t6)r ta) ~ ~1 - B6(t6)~ 8~e ~a(sa~ ~6,(saa t6)i ta)
-{-~1 - Bb(tb)~ó~a~6'(9a~ t6) sy~a(9a~ ~b~(sa~ t6), ta)~ -O
From the argument in the proof of Proposition 1 it is clear that a type tb
will only be willing to act in period 1 if A chooses the same action for all
ta E Ta. If not, tb would gain by deviating to period 2. Hence there has20
to exist an action s, which makes the first order condition above hold for
all t, E T,. While the present assumptions on the payoff functions do not
rule this possibility out, it does seem rather unlikely. Note that the two first
terms by Assumption 3 are increasing in t,. Hence, only if the third term for
all t, exactly offsets the effect of the rise in the two first terms can a single
sa be optimal for all t, E T,. For this to be the case á~b~ra(s„ ab~(s„tb), t,)
must be increasing in t, since aevoá~(s„tb) is negative (and independent of
t,). Therefore, a sufficient condition for the stronger statement to hold is
that ae~;(s;, o~~(s;, t~), t;) is not (monotonically) increasing in t;, and that
,
not all t; has a period 1 best response at the same endpoint of [0, s;]. It
is easy to check that in the simple Cournot model with linear demand and
incomplete information about the rival's unit cost, ei~ ~r;(s;, o~~(s;, t~), t;) is
independent of t;. Hence, the stronger statement is true for this model as
long as [0, s;] is sufficiently large.
Also in proving Proposition 2 some preliminaries are useful. Define first




Hence, the degenerate belief q;` indicates that player j with probability 1
believes that player i is of the type t;`. Now, suppose B6(tb) - 0 for all tb E Tb.
Consider any candidate PBE in which B,(ta) C 1 for some ta E Ta. Player
B's consistent period 2 belief q, is then formed by Bayes' rule as described
in Section 2. Denote by tM the maximum t, for which Ba(t,} G 1, and by21
q;~ the degenerate belief associated with t;~. For a given player i period 2
strategy a?" and belief q;, player j's period 2 best response ~~"(v?", q;,t~) is
found as
~jn(Q?ni qii tJ) - argmax~ qi(ti)~7(37i ~?n(ti)i tJ)
~~ES~ 7;
Note that by Lemma 1 we know that ~~"(a.?",q;, t~) is increasing in t~ if
its value lies in the interior of S~ -[0, s~].
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-.(, jor any non-degenemte q, E Qa, iJ
(Oá", Ob") is the equilibrium of the peréod 2 simultaneous choice game with
the beliefs (qa, p6) and qM is the degenemte belief associafed with the highest
ta in the support of qa, then for any tb E Te,
Y'E"(~a"~ q~i t6) C ~6"(Qo"i qai t6)
Proof. By Lemma 1 aá" is increasing in ta. Since 8ab~8só is decreasing in sa
the lemma must be true. ~~
Lemma 3 Let qa 6e non-degene~nte and qM the degenemte óelief associated
with tM, the highest element in the support of qa. If (Oá"~,O'b"~) and (pánM
~bnM) are the period 2 equilibria associated with (qa, pd) and (qM, pb), respec-
tively, then
(a) osn.(tM) ~
Q7nM(tM) a a a a
(b) ~TsP6(t6)~a(Qo"~(t~)~~b"~(tD),tM) C LTsP6(t6)~a(QanMltMl QbnM(t6)ita )22
Proof. Proof of (a): Since q;~ is degenerate, for any o;", ~e"(O'án, qM, te) -
mb~(oá"(t;~), tb). Hence, by the uniqueness of the period 2 equilibrium,




C ~an(~D,lQan.(t~)i t6)~Í~6i t~)
- WalOon,(t~))
By the uniqueness of the fixed point, the first part of the lemma must be
true.
Proof of (b): From (a) and Assumption 3, for all t6 E Tb,
,{.2n 2n. q
) D,( anM1 ~)i b) W6 (O'a , a, tb i lb O t t
By Assumption 1 the second part of the lemma must hold. ~~
Lemma 4 Let qá E Qa be the degenemte belief associated with t; E T„ and
let (O'ánk, Qynk) be the period i equilibrium associated with (qá, pb). Then,
under Assumptions 1- 4, for all tá E T„
t~ 07nk tk ~snk t tk G max t a(s ~2~(s t) tk) ~P6( b) a( a ( a)~ D ( b)~ a) saESa~pe(
b) a a, 6 a, 6 i a
Proof. Note first that the right hand side of the inequality is the best ex-
pected payoff to tá if she deviates to the first period. Clearly, Obnk(tp) -23
~s!(Qánk(tá),tb) - sb(tb). Hence, o;"k(t;) is implicitly defined by
a k k
~P6(tb)ás Aa(9a~96(tb)rta) - ~
Tb a
Moving in the first period tá could ensure herself the same expected payoff as
in the period 2 equilibrium by choosing the same action aá"k(tá). However,
this is not optimal as
8 2nk k k k
~TyP6(t6)BsoAa(Qa (ta)isó(t6)rta)
} (t ) a 4~(Q2nk(tk) t 8~(~2nk(tk)
3k(t t) i 0 ~ToPbl 6 aio~ó a l a~ 6)g~~ a a l a ~ b b)~ n
since the first expression is zero and the second strictly positive under As-
sumptions 1 and 2. Hence, by moving to the first period and choosing a
slightly larger action t; could increase her payoff. The lemma, therefore,
must be true. ~~
Proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 4 shows that there can never be an equilibrium with 96(tb) - 0
for all t6 E Te and BQ(t,) G 1 for a single t, E T, only. So suppose 9a(ta) c 1
for more than one ta. Then Lemmas 3 and 4 together show that the highest
of these types would prefer deviating to the first period to staying in the
second period. This proves the proposition. ~~
Lemma 5 Let (Oánh Qbnh) and (?ánm~ Obnn`) be the period 2 equilibria asso-
ciated with (qá, py) and ( qá , pb),lrespecfively, where q; ~ qQ are degenerate24
and t; G t; . Then, under Assumptions 1-.~,
maX ~ P6(t6)~a(9ai Qónh(t6)i tó C~ (t 7r (Q2nm(tm) Q4nm(t
) tm)
inESo T.e
) T' p6 6) a a a~ y D~ a
Proof. By an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3(a), oónh(tb) 1
ob"m(tb) for all t6 E Tb; hence, by Asaumption 1, the lemma must be true.~~
Proofof Proposition 3.
Let Ba(ta) - 1 for all fa E Ta and 66(ib) - 0 for all tb E Tb. Furthermore,
let B's period 2 belief be the degenerate belief q;, and let the strategies o;
and Qb" be chosen optimally according to these probabilities. Clearly, no B
type will ever deviate to period 1; this is simply the reverse of Proposition
1. By Lemma 4 the lowest A type, t;, will not deviate to the second period.
Neither will any other type, by combining Lemmas 4 and 5. ~~
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